Vandevere v. Lloyd by Baltes, Heather
Public Land & Resources Law Review 
Volume 0 Case Summaries 2011-2012 Article 18 
March 2013 
Vandevere v. Lloyd 
Heather Baltes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Baltes, Heather (2013) "Vandevere v. Lloyd," Public Land & Resources Law Review: Vol. 0 , Article 18. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr/vol0/iss2/18 
This Case Summary is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Public Land & Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at 
University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In Vandevere v. Lloyd,
1
 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Alaska in favor of the Alaska Commissioner of Fisheries.
2
  The court 
held:  (1) plaintiffs’ entry permits to commercially harvest salmon were state licenses;
3
 (2) 
plaintiffs’ entry permits were not a constitutionally protected property interest;
4
 (3) plaintiffs 
waived their right to challenge state regulation of shore fishery leases by signing their lease 
agreements;
5
 and (4) state regulation did not violate plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights.
6
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 The Alaska Constitution prohibits the creation of a special privilege or exclusive right in 
a state fishery and permits the limitation of entry into a fishery to promote resource conservation 
and prevent economic hardship for commercial, recreational, and private uses.
7
  The Alaska 
Board of Fisheries (Board) has the authority to regulate any harvest of fish and has the exclusive 
right to regulate fish harvests in Alaska’s waters.
8
  From 1996 to 2002, the Board promulgated a 
series of regulations significantly amending the 1978 Upper Cook Inlet Salmon Management 
Plan to emphasize salmon conservation rather than commercial fishing.
9
  In response to 
conservation problems, the Board shortened drift gill net and set gill net seasons, and restricted 
                                                          
1
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commercial fishing in certain areas of the Cook Inlet.
10
  The Board sought proposals to amend 
regulations, made the proposals available to the public, and held public meetings for comment on 
the proposed regulations bi-annually.
11
  
 Pursuant to restrictions imposed by the Alaska Constitution, the Board did not create an 
exclusive right or special privilege in the entry permit holder, or an interest in the fish or water 
above the leased tidal or submerged land.
12
  All entry permits and permit holders are subject to 
regulations promulgated by the Board and the Board may modify or revoke the permits without 
just compensation.
13
  The Alaska Department of Natural Resources grants lease of tidal or 
submerged land in the fishery to allow the use of set gill nets.
14
  The lease does not convey an 
interest “in the water above the land or in the fish in the water.”
15
  The lease merely allows 
fishermen to set gill nets or shore gill nets to harvest fish.
16
 
 The plaintiffs held entry permits to use drift gill nets and leases to submerged lands in 
Cook Inlet to set gill nets.
17
  In May 2007, the plaintiffs sued the Commissioner of Fisheries in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to 
revoke regulations that curtailed commercial harvest of salmon in specific areas of the Cook 
Inlet.
18
  The suit alleged the regulatory changes since 1996 constituted a regulatory taking of 
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property for which the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation.
19
  After the Alaska Supreme 
Court issued a decision in a similar case,
20
 the district court denied relief and granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Fisheries.
21
  The district court held that plaintiffs 
lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in their entry permit, waived any right to 
compensation, and had not suffered a violation of their substantive due process rights.
22
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Entry permits to harvest salmon in Cook Inlet were state licenses. 
 The Ninth Circuit relied on state law to determine what type of interest an entry permit 
conveyed to a fisherman.
23
  The court differentiated between “old property interests” owned 
solely by the holder and “new property interests” that are limited by the government.
24
  The court 
concluded that entry permits are state licenses that constitute “new property interests” and 
therefore state law determines the nature of the plaintiffs’ property interest in the entry permits 
at-issue.
25
   
B.  Plaintiffs’ entry permits were not a constitutionally protected property interest.  
 The court reviewed the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision and analysis in Vanek to 
determine whether the plaintiffs’ entry permits created a constitutionally property interest under 
state law.
26
  The Alaska Supreme Court relied on state statutes, constitutional provisions, and 
case law in holding that commercial entry permits to harvest salmon in the Cook Inlet were not a 
compensable property interest even when their value decreased due to regulation.
27
  In 
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accordance with the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding, the Ninth Circuit held the plaintiffs’ entry 
permits were not a constitutionally protected property interest.
28
 
C.  Plaintiffs waived any takings challenge to state regulations when they signed the shore 
fishery leases.  
 
 The court determined the plaintiffs waived any compensation for a taking of property by 
signing the shore fishery lease agreements.
29
  A provision of the shore fishery lease agreements 
explicitly reserved the right of the state to adopt regulations that impacted the activities of the 
lessee.
30
  The lease further required the lessee comply with all existing and future regulations.
31
  
The lease did preserve the lessee’s right to compensation for a taking of the physical area of their 
leasehold, but not a regulatory taking that limited the quantity of fish the lessee could harvest.
32
  
The court reasoned that provisions of the shore fishery lease indicated the plaintiffs waived their 
right to challenge the regulations upon signing the lease agreements.
33
   
D.  State regulation of entry permit and shore fishery lease systems did not violate 
substantive due process. 
 
 The court recognized that state law simultaneously created and demarcated the entry 
permit system and shore fishery leases, and thus it was not a violation of the plaintiffs’ 
substantive due process rights to declare that entry permits are not constitutionally protected 
property interests.
34
  The state did not need to establish a system that created commercial harvest 
licenses, or use permits, that conveyed constitutionally protected property interests.  
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Subsequently, the state’s entry permit and shore fishery lease systems were not unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or capricious.
35
   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 Vandevere v. Lloyd upholds Alaska’s ability to regulate commercial fishing by issuing 
entry permits and leases to commercially harvest salmon that are subject to modification, 
limitation, and additional regulation.  The court evaluated whether a permit to harvest fish and a 
lease to use submerged tidelands constituted a constitutionally protected property interest.  The 
court reasoned the entry permits and shore fishery leases are state licenses governed by state 
regulation, and the licenses do not convey a protected and compensable property interest.  The 
court held that the plaintiffs waived their right to challenge the state’s regulation of shore fishery 
leases by signing the lease agreements.  Finally, the court held the state did not violate 
substantive due process in the adoption of new regulations. 
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